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1. Preliminaries 
Polysemy is usually characterized as the phenomenon whereby a single word 
form is associated with two or several related senses, as in (1) below: 
(1) draw a line; read a line; a line around eyes; a wash on a line; wait in a line; 
a line of bad decisions, etc. 
In this, it is contrasted with monosemy, on the one hand, and with homonymy, 
on the other. While a monosemous form has only one meaning, a homonymous 
form is associated with two or several unrelated meanings (e.g., coach; ‘bus’, 
‘sports instructor’), and is standardly viewed as involving different lexemes (e.g., 
COACH1, COACH2).  
Polysemy is pervasive in natural languages, and affects both content and 
function words. While deciding which sense is intended on a given occasion of 
use rarely seems to cause any difficulty for speakers of a language, polysemy has 
proved notoriously difficult to treat both theoretically and empirically. Some of 
the questions that have occupied linguists, philosophers and psychologists 
interested in the phenomenon concern the representation of polysemous senses 
in the mental lexicon, how we should deal with polysemous words in a 
compositional theory of meaning, how novel senses of a word arise in the course 
of communication, and how hearers, usually effortlessly, arrive at the 
contextually appropriate sense on a given occasion of use. 
The definition and delimitation of the polysemy phenomenon itself also remains 
a source of theoretical discussion across disciplines: how do we tell polysemy 
apart from monosemy on the one hand, and from homonymy on the other? At 
first glance, the contrast with monosemy is clearer: while a monosemous term 
has only a single meaning, a polysemous term is associated with several senses. 
However, the literature shows that distinguishing polysemy from monosemy is 
far from a trivial matter. A famous case in point is the debate between Jackendoff 
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(1992a) and Fodor (1998) concerning the English verb keep. Jackendoff argues 
that keep must be polysemous, given that it has different meaning in 
constructions such as keep the money, keep the car in the garage, and keep the 
crowd happy. Fodor, on his side, argues in favour of a monosemy account of keep 
in which it means KEEP in all cases, and the apparent difference in meanings is 
simply an artefact of the different contexts in which the verb appears.  
Several linguistic tests have been devised to distinguish polysemy from 
monosemy. Particularly well known is Zwicky and Saddock’s (1975) identity test 
by conjunction reduction, where the conjunction of two different senses or 
meanings of a word in a single construction gives rise to zeugma. For instance, 
the verb expire has (at least) the two senses ‘cease to be valid’ and ‘die’, and so 
the sentence ?Arthur and his driving license expired yesterday is zeugmatic. 
Another type of test exploits the impossibility of anaphorically referring to 
different senses (Cruse, 2004a). For instance, in the sentence ?John read a line 
from his new poem. It was straight. the pronoun cannot simultaneously refer to a 
sense of line combinable with the modifier straight (e.g., ‘long, narrow mark or 
band’) and the sense of line in the previous sentence (‘row of written/printed 
words’), which suggests that we have to do with a case of lexical ambiguity. 
However, such tests for identity of meaning do not give clear-cut answers (for a 
review, see Geeraerts, 1993). In particular, only a slight manipulation of the 
context can yield a different result, as shown by the following example (Norrick, 
1981: 115):  
(2) a. ? Judy’s dissertation is thought provoking though yellowed with age. 
b. Judy’s dissertation is still thought provoking though yellowed with age. 
While the sentence in (2a) is zeugmatic – apparently due to the use of Judy’s 
dissertation to refer to a type of informational content in the first conjunct and a 
physical object in the second conjunct – no zeugmatic effect occurs when the 
sentence is slightly altered as in (2b). Furthermore, the tests typically do not 
distinguish between polysemy and homonymy – that is, they do not distinguish 
between senses or meanings that are related and those that are unrelated – both 
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of which come out as instances of a more general phenomenon of lexical 
ambiguity. 
Many scholars see the distinction between polysemy and homonymy as being of 
little theoretical interest (e.g., Cruse, 1986; Kempson, 1977), and the significant 
distinction as being that between lexical ambiguity and monosemy. However, 
there is recent work in psycholinguistics that suggests that related and unrelated 
senses (or meanings) may be associated with different storage profiles (e.g., 
Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002), although 
the results are to some extent conflicting (e.g., Foraker & Murphy, 2012; Klein & 
Murphy, 2001). An important reason for the different results obtained is that 
polysemy itself is a multifarious phenomenon, and it is not always clear that the 
experimental items used across studies are comparable with respect to the form 
of polysemy they exhibit.  
Finally, the linguistic tests have also been used to distinguish lexical ambiguity 
(including homonymy and ‘accidental’ polysemy) from so-called ‘logical’ 
polysemy (see below) (Asher, 2011), on the assumption that the different senses 
of a logically polysemous expression can be felicitously conjoined and 
anaphorically referred to by use of a pronoun. An example of successful 
conjunction is the sentence Lunch was delicious but took forever, where lunch 
refers consecutively to a type of food and to an event type. An example of a 
felicitous anaphora is found in the sentence That book is boring. Put it on the top 
shelf, where the pronoun it refers anaphorically to the physical object sense of 
the noun book, even though the sense of book activated in the previous sentence 
is the information sense. In contrast, lexically ambiguous terms give rise to 
zeugma when conjoined and do not allow for anaphoric reference. Used this way, 
the conjunction and the anaphoric reference tests seem capable of distinguishing 
some types of lexical ambiguity (homonymy and accidental polysemy) from 
others (logical polysemy), but not between logical polysemy and monosemy. 
It is customary in the literature to distinguish between regular or logical 
polysemy, on the one hand, and irregular or accidental polysemy, on the other 
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(Apresjan, 1974; Asher, 2011; Pustejovsky, 1995)1. In a classic paper, Apresjan 
(1974: 16) described the polysemy of a word A in a given language with the 
meanings ai and aj as being regular if “there exists at least one other word B with 
the meanings bi and bj, which are semantically distinguished from each other in 
exactly the same way as ai and aj (…).” Examples in English are terms for animals, 
which (with some exceptions) can be used to denote either the animal or the 
meat of that animal (e.g., chicken, rabbit, turkey, etc.), terms for containers used 
to denote either the container itself or its contents (e.g., He drank the whole 
bottle/glass/mug, etc.), names of artists used to denote their works (e.g., Proust is 
on the top shelf, Mary owns a Picasso) and so on. In formal semantic and 
computational approaches, regular polysemy of this kind is typically analysed as 
being generated by lexical rules, in this way accounting for the productivity and 
cross-linguistic availability of the patterns of sense extension and at the same 
time avoiding a listing of all senses for the words in question (Asher & 
Lascarides, 2003; Copestake & Briscoe, 1995; Gillon, 1992; Kilgarriff, 1992; 
Ostler & Atkins, 1992; Pustejovsky, 1995). While this is certainly one way of 
accounting for the regularity involved in this sort of polysemy, there are also 
other, more pragmatically-oriented explanations, which we will discuss further 
below. 
Irregular polysemy, on the other hand, is described by Apresjan (1974: 16) as 
cases where the semantic distinction between the meanings ai and aj for a word 
A cannot be found in any other word of the given language. The English verb run 
may be an example of this: its different senses in run a mile, run a shop, run late, 
run on gasoline, etc. seem idiosyncratic to this particular lexical item, and may 
each have arisen as a result of different lexical semantic or pragmatic processes, 
such as for instance specification, loosening, metaphorical extension, and so on.  
However, the distinction between regular and irregular polysemy is not clear-cut 
either. As to irregular polysemy, there appears to be degrees of irregularity, with 
some cases being clearly idiosyncratic, and others constrained by the way 
meaning chains tend to develop (Sweetser, 1990; Taylor, 2003). For instance, 
                                                        
1 It is also possible to distinguish regular from logical polysemy, logical polysemy being a 
subclass of regular polysemy, which is operationally defined as polysemy which passes the 
conjunction and anaphoric reference tests (Asher, 2011). 
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cognitive linguists have offered exhaustive accounts of the polysemy of 
prepositions (see, e.g., Brugman 1988 for a pioneering account of the polysemy 
of English over) where they bring to light a series of meaning chains, starting 
with a preliminary, usually embodied, sense, which extend to new domains in 
semi-predictable ways. Also, some regular polysemy can be characterized as 
idiosyncratic or accidental, at least in the sense that it may be idiosyncratic to 
particular languages or language communities and its existence seems to be a 
matter of historical accident. One example may be Nunberg’s (1979) much-cited 
ham sandwich-case, where waiters in a restaurant exploit the pattern ‘meal-for-
customer’ in making reference to their customers (e.g., The ham sandwich wants 
his bill). This seems to be an instance of regular polysemy in Apresjan’s (1974) 
sense, of non-logical polysemy in Asher’s (2011) sense, and could also be 
described as a case of idiosyncratic polysemy (even though one usually talks 
about idiosyncratic and irregular polysemy interchangeably).  
Recent work on polysemy is as varied as is the phenomenon itself, both in its 
focus and methods. In general linguistics, polysemy received little attention for 
many years, mainly due to the predominance of generative grammar with its 
focus on the sentence as the central unit of meaning. However, with the 
emergence of the cognitive grammar during the 1980s polysemy emerged on the 
research agenda as a key topic in lexical semantics, in particular as a result of the 
pioneering studies conducted by George Lakoff (1987) and Claudia Brugman 
(1988) on the polysemy of English prepositions. Alongside the cognitive 
linguistic movement, polysemy has become a central topic of investigation 
within many formal and computational semantic approaches, starting with 
Pustejovsky’s (1995) seminal work on the topic and most recently culminating in 
Asher’s (2011) monograph Lexical Meaning in Context. With their focus on 
semantic compositionality, these accounts have focused mainly on logical 
polysemy, which seems to be more tractable from a formal/computational point 
of view. In addition to these two main trends in the research on polysemy, much 
of the work conducted within the relatively new field of lexical pragmatics has a 
direct bearing on the topic (e.g., Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004; Wilson & 
Carston, 2007). These approaches are mainly concerned with how polysemy 
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relates to the interaction between linguistically-encoded content and contextual 
information in the derivation of speaker-intended meanings. In the 
psycholinguistic literature, polysemy has attracted interest due to the issues it 
raises for semantic representation, in particular, how the mental lexicon 
represents polysemy compared with homonymy, a distinction that has been 
investigated using different methods and techniques (e.g., Klein & Murphy, 2001; 
Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007; Pylkkänen, Llinás, & Murphy, 2006). Finally, 
recent lexicographical approaches have focused on creating tools for extracting 
senses from corpus data (Geeraerts, 2010). 
Until recently there has been little interaction between these different 
approaches to the study of polysemy. However, we think a common ground 
between them is now emerging, where we are beginning to see the promise of 
some unified treatments, with psycholinguists working with proposals from 
computational semantics and lexical pragmatics, and theoreticians showing 
increased interest in experimental results and psychological models. This 
volume aims to make advancement in this interdisciplinary line of study by 
bringing together research done in each of the areas described above. In the next 
section, we will outline the main parameters of the current debate in the new 
‘common ground’, by focusing on two key questions which – either explicitly or 
implicitly – have occupied most researchers working on polysemy: semantic 
representation and mental storage on the one hand, and the mechanisms of 
polysemy generation on the other. In Section 3, we present a recent 
lexicographical approach to the study of polysemy. 
2. Approaches to polysemy representation, storage, and generation 
2.1. The sense enumeration lexicon  
The ‘sense enumeration lexicon hypothesis’ holds that all the different senses of 
a polysemous expression are represented in the mental lexicon. That is, there is a 
distinct representation for each sense of a polysemous word. The model was first 
proposed by Katz (1972), it underlies most of the early work in the cognitive 
grammar tradition (Brugman, 1988; Brugman & Lakoff, 1988; Lakoff, 1987) and 
has lately been advocated by some psycholinguists (Foraker & Murphy, 2012; 
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Klein & Murphy, 2001). In this model, the distinction between polysemy and 
homonymy is attenuated. Although defenders of the model may distinguish 
between polysemy and homonymy based on whether the different senses or 
meanings and thought to belong to a single lexical entry or not, this difference 
does not seem to carry much weight at the level of storage or of processing. In 
both polysemy and homonymy, senses or meanings are thought to be stored as 
distinct representations. And when it comes to processing, polysemy resolution, 
just as homonymy resolution, consists in selecting a sense or a meaning from 
within a list of distinct senses or meanings associated with the word form.  
The sense enumeration model is prima facie the simplest way to deal with 
polysemy on theoretical grounds. If the aim of semantics is to build a 
compositional model of linguistic interpretation, then it seems that the least 
problematic option is to postulate that all variability in the semantic contribution 
of one expression is due to that expression’s having different senses stored as 
distinct representations. Speakers and hearers have to select one of these senses 
but once this is done, the compositional process can proceed as normal. 
However, even from a purely theoretical point of view, the sense enumeration 
hypothesis turns out to be problematic.  
First, many words have a large number of different senses. Postulating that the 
full range of senses for each word is stored entails a (potentially) indefinite 
proliferation of mentally stored senses in order to cover the range of uses of 
words (as an illustration, see Brugman, 1988, who identifies nearly a hundred 
different uses of the English preposition over). Not only does this place an 
enormous demand on the storage capacity of the language user, but it also fails 
to distinguish between those aspects of meaning that are part of the word 
meaning proper and those that result from its interaction with the context, a 
problem sometimes referred to as the ‘polysemy fallacy’ (Sandra, 1998). Second, 
polysemy is pervasive, which means that sentences typically contain several 
polysemous terms. Selection of a sense for one expression would depend on the 
selection of senses for the rest. If speakers and hearers have to access all the 
possible sense combinations for each sentence, then processing just a simple 
sentence would be costly. 
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The sense enumeration hypothesis faces some empirical problems as well. As we 
have already mentioned, it does not distinguish between polysemy and 
homonymy. However, experimental evidence from psycholinguistics suggest that 
while the different senses of polysemous expressions prime each other, i.e., the 
activation of one sense activates the others as well, homonymy resolution 
involves competition, rather than priming (Klepousniotou, Titone, & Romero, 
2008). Furthermore, polysemous expressions whose senses are closely related 
show a processing advantage in that words with multiple related senses tend to 
be responded to faster than words with fewer senses (Azuma & van Orden, 1997; 
Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007; Rodd et al., 2002). However, if all senses are 
represented distinctly in the mental lexicon, then having more senses should be 
either disadvantageous for the speed of response (if the hearer has to access all 
the different senses and pick out the relevant one), or have no effect at all (if only 
the relevant sense is accessed). Finally, work done by Steven Frisson with the 
eye-tracking technique suggests that while homonym resolution seems to 
require immediate selection one of the homonymous meanings, polysemy 
resolution appears to involve the initial activation of an underspecified meaning 
before the reader homes in on the appropriate sense on the basis of the context 
that follows (see Frisson, 2009, for a summary). 
Recently, however, some psycholinguists have vindicated the sense enumeration 
model on empirical grounds (Foraker & Murphy, 2012; Klein & Murphy, 2001; 
but cf. Pylkännen, Llinás & Murphy, 2006). Klein and Murphy (2001) 
investigated the representation of a set of polysemous words using behavioural 
tasks. They asked their participants to make a sense/nonsense judgement on 
phrases containing a polysemous word (e.g., daily paper, shredded paper), and 
found that participants were faster and made fewer errors in their sensicality 
judgements when the target phrase had been primed by a phrase using a 
consistent sense (e.g., [daily paper], liberal PAPER) than by one using an 
inconsistent sense (e.g., [daily paper], shredded PAPER), i.e. a consistency effect. 
The lack of priming effects found for the senses of their polysemous words led 
them to conclude that these were represented in the same way as homonyms.  
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In a follow-up study, Foraker and Murphy (2012) present results from an eye-
tracking study which suggest that not all polysemous expressions are 
represented in the same way: while some polysemes indeed behave as 
homonyms, others may require a different approach (see also Klepousniotou et 
al., 2008). For instance, in the case of paper, the senses appear to be quite distant 
from each other, which may be why they behave much like the meanings of 
homonymous terms (i.e. show signs of competition rather than priming). 
However, more closely related senses such as the animal and meat senses of 
animal terms (chicken, rabbit, turkey, etc.) seem to prime each other. On Foraker 
and Murphy’s view, a sense enumeration model might still be able to 
accommodate this pattern of results but, as they suggest, “it is possible that 
questions about how senses are activated do not have a single answer but differ 
depending on the word and the nature of the polysemy” (2012: 424). It could be 
added that the question of storage may also depend on the word and the nature 
of the polysemy.  
Although the studies by Klein and Murphy (2001) and Foraker and Murphy 
(2012) provide some experimental evidence in favour of sense enumeration, 
some methodological problems with their experiments have been pointed out 
(Klepousniotou et al., 2008). In particular, these concern the experimental items 
used, whose polysemy status is not always clear and contain no distinction 
between nouns, adjectives and verbs. Frisson (this volume) aimed at replicating 
the experiments by Klein and Murphy (2001) and Foraker and Murphy (2012) 
using a more controlled set of stimuli, and to test whether sense dominance (i.e., 
frequency) could have played a role in the consistency effect found by these 
experiments. Given the evidence that sense dominance affects the processing of 
homonyms, with the more frequent meaning being easier to process than the 
subordinate meaning (e.g., Rayner & Duffy, 1986), we should expect to find the 
same effect for polysemes if they are represented like homonyms. Frisson’s two 
experiments consisted in a sensicality task (cf. Klein & Murphy 2001) and an eye-
movement study (cf. Foraker & Murphy 2012). The stimuli were restricted to 
nouns that were polysemous between an abstract and a concrete sense (e.g., 
book, manuscript, notice, journal, etc.), and where, according to the British 
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National Corpus,2 the abstract sense was always the most frequent (i.e., 
dominant).  
First, in the sensicality task, subjects were presented with a prime noun phrase 
in which the adjective focused on either the concrete (e.g., bound book) or the 
abstract (e.g., scary book) sense. Then they were asked to make a sensicality 
judgement about a target noun phrase in which the adjective focused on either 
the consistent (e.g., [well-plotted book], scary BOOK), or the inconsistent (e.g., 
[bound book], scary BOOK] sense. The results showed a clear consistency effect, 
with increased processing time in the inconsistent condition compared with the 
consistent condition, but no effect of either sense dominance or direction of 
sense switch (concrete to abstract or abstract to concrete) in the inconsistent 
condition. While the absence of a processing advantage for the dominant sense is 
difficult to accommodate for a sense enumeration theory, the results are 
compatible with a relevance theory-inspired view (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 
1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2004) which predicts that the disambiguating 
information provided by the adjective should make processing of either sense 
equally easy, but that revising an interpretation that has been established as 
optimally relevant should be costly.  
Second, in the eye movement study, subjects were exposed to similar 
polysemous words in a regular reading task. There were three conditions: The 
neutral conditions aimed at testing how quickly a specific sense is assigned to a 
polysemous word without prior contextual indication (Neutral-dominant: Mary 
told me that the book was scary, Neutral-subordinate: Mary told me that the book 
was bound). The repeat conditions aimed at testing the effect of sense repetition 
on ease of processing (Repeat-dominant: Mary told me that the science-fiction 
book was scary, Repeat-subordinate: Mary told me that the gift-wrapped book 
was bound). Finally, the switch conditions tested whether switching from one 
sense involves an extra processing cost (Switch-dominant: Mary told me that the 
bound book was scary, Switch-subordinate: Mary told me that the scary book was 
bound). The most important results were as follows: In the neutral conditions, 
subjects did not have more difficulty disambiguating towards the subordinate 
                                                        
2 http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk 
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sense than toward the dominant sense of the polysemous noun. This goes 
against the sense enumeration hypothesis and a relevance theory-inspired view, 
which would predict that the most frequent sense should be faster to access.3  In 
the repeat conditions, subjects spent more time reading the polysemous noun 
than in the neutral condition, but the time to select a particular sense was not 
affected by sense frequency. This also goes against both sense enumeration and a 
relevance theory-inspired view, which would predict faster reading times when 
a sense has already been accessed than in the neutral condition. Finally, the 
results from the switch conditions showed that processing was more difficult in 
this context than in the neutral context, and also that switching from a 
subordinate to a dominant sense induced a greater cost than vice versa, a result 
compatible with both sense enumeration and a relevance theory-inspired view. 
As an explanation of this asymmetric difficulty, Frisson suggests that readers 
might ‘commit’ (Frazier & Rayner, 1990) more strongly to the concrete 
(subordinate) sense, making it harder to switch to a different interpretation. The 
reader might assume that if the writer has made the effort to focus on a less 
common sense, he should pay more attention to it. Frisson takes the results from 
his eye-movement study to be best explained by a model that takes polysemous 
expressions to initially activate an underspecified, abstract representation which 
encompasses all its established senses (in the present case this would include 
both the content and the physical object senses), and where context is then used 
to ‘home in’ on the intended sense (see, e.g., Frisson, 2009). In the following 
section, we discuss this option in more detail. 
2.2. The one representation hypothesis 
The main alternative to the sense enumeration lexicon hypothesis is the so-
called ‘one representation hypothesis’. According to this hypothesis, the senses 
                                                        
3 Frisson’s use of the notion ‘relevance theory-inspired view’ reflects the fact that the predictions 
from actual relevance theory often cannot be stated in general terms like this, but may depend on 
a number of factors. One important factor in the present context is whether the book type of 
polysemy is hypothesised to involve a single concept or distinct concepts. If distinct concepts, we 
get the predictions that follow from Frisson’s relevance theory-inspired view for the relation 
between dominant-subordinate senses in the neutral and repeat conditions. But if there is only a 
single concept associated with the book type of polysemy, which seems to be the dominant view 
in the literature (e.g., Cruse, 1986; Falkum, 2011; Nunberg, 1979; Pustejovsky, 1995), the 
predictions of relevance theory are likely to be very similar to those made by Frisson’s 
underspecification hypothesis (see below). 
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of a polysemous expression either belong to or depend on a single 
representation. The hypothesis that the different senses of a polysemous 
expression depend on a single representation is clearly more cautious than the 
claim that they belong to, i.e. are stored as part of, a single representation. In fact, 
most researchers who defend the one representation hypothesis espouse this 
more moderate claim. The general idea is that, when interpreting a polysemous 
expression, competent speakers access a semantic representation which acts as a 
gateway to the different senses. There are different ways to cash out this 
proposal, ranging from the decompositional account of Pustejovsky (1995), 
where senses are generated on the basis of informationally rich lexical 
representations, to Carston’s (2012) recent proposal that the representation that 
speakers first access in encountering a word may simply embody some 
constraints on what the word may express (cf. ‘pointers to a conceptual space’, 
Carston, 2002). 
 In recent years, psycholinguists have debated two proposals that fall under the 
one representation approach, ‘the core meaning hypothesis’ and ‘the 
underspecification hypothesis’. However, it is not clear how much these two 
hypotheses differ, since their more concrete commitments still remain to be 
spelled out. We think that the core-meaning approach can be understood as a 
kind of underspecification approach, and in what follows we will treat it that 
way. 
Underspecification accounts have been proposed to deal with a variety of 
phenomena, including scope ambiguities (Egg, 2011) and alleged type-shifting 
constructions (de Almeida & Dwivedi, 2008). The underspecification approach to 
polysemy holds that hearers, when encountering a polysemous expression, do 
not opt for a particular sense but rather access an underspecified representation 
which is enriched only if required by the context. This hypothesis has been 
defended by Steven Frisson in a number of papers (for a review, Frisson, 2009), 
although he is not very specific about what exactly the hypothesis amounts to. 
According to Frisson, it is compatible with views as different as Pustejovsky’s 
(1995) generative lexicon (more specifically, his notion of qualia structures), 
Carston’s minimalist proposal (2012), as well as the core meaning approach 
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holding that the representation accessed is some abstract meaning that is shared 
by all the different senses of a polysemous word (Ruhl, 1989). In our view, the 
most important difference between these three options lies in what we can call 
‘thin’ and ‘rich’ semantics, i.e. between minimalist and core meaning proposals 
on the one hand, and accounts inspired by Pustejovsky’s rich lexical 
representations on the other hand. 
2.2.1. Thin semantics 
Let us start with ‘thin semantics’. Thin semantics is the view that lexical, or 
standing meanings of words are impoverished with respect to their occasional 
meanings (i.e. the meanings they express on a certain occasion of utterance, 
which is their contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentential utterance). 
This view has a long tradition (see Maienborn, 2011), and has recently gained 
momentum by being associated with contextualist approaches and the so-called 
‘semantic underdeterminacy thesis’ (Carston, 2002), according to which the 
semantic content of a sentential utterance underdetermines its truth-conditional 
meaning. Although the thesis is compatible with different views on lexical 
meaning, one natural approach is to postulate a thin semantics, according to 
which lexical meanings only contain information which constrains the range of 
concepts that words can be used to express (Carston, 2012; Travis, 2008), or 
provide semantic potentials, which may be summary representations of past 
uses of words which guide new uses (Recanati, 2004).  
These versions of the underspecification view suggest a discontinuity between 
underspecified semantic representations and the concepts word-tokens express. 
Other proposals in the thin semantics camp do not posit this kind of separation. 
For instance, Bierwisch and Schreuder (1992) distinguish between semantic and 
conceptual representations, where semantic representations are taken to consist 
of sets of necessary conditions, which are typically compositionally enriched 
through feature addition in order to yield a truth-conditional content. Two 
papers in this collection -- those by Alexandra Spalek and Vyvyan Evans -- 
explicitly defend a thin semantics version of the underspecification approach to 
polysemy. We will return to Evans’s approach in Section 2.4.  
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In her analysis of two Spanish verbs, cortar (‘cut’) and romper (‘break’), Spalek 
(this volume) argues for an underspecified, thin lexical meaning which is 
enriched in composition, and shows how the (occasional) meaning of these verbs 
depends on the kind of internal argument they take. Both verbs can combine 
with nouns denoting physical objects, but they also accept abstract themes, such 
as states, processes, or norms. The meaning they express is clearly different 
depending on the kind of object they combine with, but the differences also 
extend to the patterns of alternations they admit and the selectional restrictions 
they impose on the external argument. For instance, while cortar admits the 
anticausative alternation in cortar la comunicación (‘cut the communication’), 
romper la ley (‘break the law’) only admits agents as subjects (see also Rappaport 
Hovav, 2014). 
Spalek further argues that neither a sense enumeration model nor a 
contextualist approach à la Recanati (2004), which appeals to pragmatics (and in 
particular to the process of ‘free enrichment’) to explain the diversity of 
occasional meanings, can explain her data. According to Spalek, the variability in 
the meanings expressed by these verbs, as well as the differences in their 
grammatical behaviour, should be given a compositional, semantic explanation 
in terms of Pustejovsky’s (1995) notion of ‘co-composition’, where the meaning 
of the verb is specified in combination with the meaning of the internal argument 
that it takes. Spalek gives a formal account of the process of co-composition 
based on Modern Type Theory (MTT: see below), using very fine-grained types. 
According to her, verbs such as cortar and romper should be seen as being 
represented as dependent types, whose specific interpretations are determined 
by the type of the entity that functions as the theme or object of the verb. 
Spalek concludes her paper by offering some hints about what the 
underspecified, lexical meanings of cortar and romper might be. She holds that 
both verbs express a change-of-state in which an entity which exemplifies some 
kind of connectedness (temporal or spatial) undergoes disconnection. The 
difference between cortar (‘cut’) and romper (‘break’) has to do with whether 
this disconnection is controlled, as in the ‘cut’ case, or not. The lexical meanings 
she proposes are clearly thin and underspecified in comparison with the 
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occasional meanings, and at the same time capture the elements of meaning that 
are common to all the uses of these verbs. In this way, Spalek’s proposal could 
also be seen as exemplifying a core-meaning approach.  
The ‘core meaning hypothesis’, as we understand it, is the hypothesis that the 
semantic representation of polysemous terms consists in a set of features or a 
common core that is shared by all senses of a polysemous term. As mentioned, 
this is what qualifies Bierwisch and Schreuder’s (1992) two-level semantics and 
Spalek’s proposal (this volume) as core-meaning approaches. Another prominent 
example is Jackendoff’s (1992a) analysis of the polysemy of keep, according to 
which the meaning of this verb is CAUSE [STATE OF X THAT ENDURES OVER 
TIME], with X taking values from different semantic fields: possession, location, 
mental state, etc.  
Some psycholinguists also defend a core meaning approach. For instance, 
Klepousniotou et al. (2008: 1535) describe a core meaning as “a memory 
structure encompassing all semantic features that are common across multiple 
senses of a polysemous word (e.g., for the word ‘rabbit’, a core representation 
might include [+ANIMATE, +FARM ANIMAL, +EDIBLE, +MEAT].” The idea is that 
if the senses of a polysemous word typically overlap, this could explain why they 
prime each other and why words with many senses appear to be easier to 
process than words with few senses. 
Plausible as it may seem, the core meaning approach has several shortcomings. 
First of all, it has a limited reach. As Klepousniotou et al. (2008) acknowledge, it 
can explain the cases where the senses of a polysemous term are closely related, 
but not the cases where the senses are ‘distant’ and behave more in line with 
homonyms (e.g., paper; cf. Klein and Murphy, 2001). However, its reach may 
even more limited than this. As Foraker and Murphy (2012) argue, it is not the 
case that rabbit retains the four features described above in the sentences I saw a 
rabbit running and I am cooking rabbit. In the case of a running rabbit, the rabbit 
is not edible, and it is not meat. In the case of rabbit meat, the rabbit is not 
animate. The same seems to hold for many other instances of closely related 
senses, such as for instance the polysemous patterns container-for-content (The 
 16 
DVD is one-hour long, The DVD is scratched), artist-for-works  (My father was a 
friend of Picasso, I like that Picasso, etc., or the numerous different senses of 
school (‘building’, ‘institution’, etc.; cf. Frisson, 2009).  
However, these data should not make us discard the core-meaning approach 
entirely. On the one hand, the core meaning approach does not need to commit 
to there being a common core which is present in all uses of a polysemous 
expression. The core could consist in a cluster of features, most of which are 
present in most uses of the word. On the other hand, it may be that some cases of 
polysemy are more difficult to approach in terms of common cores than others, 
and that different types of polysemy may require different treatments. For 
instance, it may be more difficult to find common cores in cases of regular 
nominal polysemy than in cases of verbal polysemy. 
2.2.2. Rich semantics 
The other alternative is the ‘rich semantics’ version of the underspecification 
approach. According to this view, lexical meanings are rich in conceptual 
information, and, typically, hearers have to select only a part of or an aspect of 
the whole informational content provided by lexical meanings. An example of 
this approach is Pustejovsky’s (1995) generative lexicon theory, which has been 
widely influential. According to Pustejovsky (1995), lexical meaning involves a 
structure consisting of four levels of representation: ‘argument structure’, ‘event 
structure’, ‘qualia structure’, and ‘lexical inheritance structure’. The qualia 
structure of a lexical item (usually exemplified by nouns) is the hallmark of 
Pustejosky’s theory and includes information about how the object came into 
being (agentive role), what kind of object it is (formal role), what it is for (telic 
role), and what it is constituted of (constitutive role). Pustejovsky (1995; see also 
Asher, 2011) restricts the notion of polysemy to logical polysemy, and postulates 
a special type, ‘dot objects’, in his type theory to account for it. Dot objects are 
lexical representations composed of two or several different senses: for instance, 
the noun book is a dot object with a ‘physical object’ sense and an ‘information’ 
sense, physical object•information, which gives rise to the polysemous senses 
in (3) below:  
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(3) a. The book is sitting on the coffee table. (‘physical object’) 
b. John found the book interesting.  (‘information’) 
c. That book with the gorgeous cover is really good (‘physical object’ + 
‘information’) 
In this theory, the different senses of a polysemous noun are represented as 
parts of a structured representation, so there is a core meaning which explains 
the polysemy of the noun. However, this rich core meaning is not equally active 
in all its uses. 
In some accounts inspired by the Pustejovskyan proposal, qualia structures are 
thought to provide ‘aspects’ or ‘facets’ (that is, different ways of seeing a given 
entity), which are also the senses that enter into truth-conditional compositions 
(Cruse, 2004b; Frisson, 2009; Paradis, 2004), an idea reminiscent of Langacker’s 
(1984) notion of ‘active zones’ (see also Falkum, 2011: 181-193). For instance, 
the polysemy of door in Mary walked through the door (‘aperture’), and Mary 
painted the door (‘physical object’) can be explained by reference to different 
highlighted aspects or facets of the qualia structure of door: its constitutive quale 
(‘aperture’), in the first case, and its formal quale (‘physical object’), in the 
second. A similar account can be given for the various senses of school (Frisson, 
2009). The noun school can stand for a building (The school needs a 
refurbishment), the place you take your children to (John made many friends at 
school), the people running the institution (The school announced budget cuts 
next year), and so on. One possibility is that all these senses are stored together 
and form part of a structure – a SCHOOL concept – which accounts for the 
relationship between all these senses. When the context brings to the fore one of 
them, the other senses will also be primed but remain less active than the one 
highlighted (see also Vicente & Martínez-Manrique, 2015).  
Vicente (this volume) develops this view and applies it to some of the so-called 
‘Travis cases’ (Travis, 2008), which are typically used to support the semantic 
underdeterminacy thesis mentioned above, and more specifically the thin 
semantics version of it. In the most discussed Travis case we are asked to 
consider two different occasions where the expression type The leaves are green 
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is uttered by a woman called ‘Pia’. In the first occasion, Pia is talking to a 
photographer who needs some green leaves for her picture. Pia has decided to 
paint green some russet maple leaves. Still, in that context, her utterance of The 
leaves are green is judged to be true. However, then comes along a botanist 
looking for green leaves. Referring to the very same leaves, Pia says again: “The 
leaves are green”. This time her utterance is judged to be false. Vicente suggests 
that it is possible to treat at least some of these cases as instances of polysemy, in 
particular, as nominal polysemy, where the aspects highlighted are related to 
two different ways of looking at objects which belong to kinds: (i) as what they 
essentially are, and (ii) as the way they appear. We believe that objects which 
belong to sortal kinds have essences, and that some of the properties that objects 
have are causally connected to their essences. However, we also know that it is 
possible to change the properties that an object has, even those properties linked 
to its essence (e.g. we can change the colour of the leaves from red to green). 
Thus, when we are told that a certain object has a certain property, it is always 
possible to ask: does it have that property in the sense of intrinsically having it, 
or does it have it only in the sense that it only displays it? 
Vicente proposes that the variation exemplified by the best known Travis cases 
can be subsumed under the following generalisation: If we have an object O of 
kind K, and a property P which is causally linked to the essence that O has in 
virtue of being a K, then ‘Det K is P’ -- where ‘Det K’ refers to O -- is ambiguous 
between two readings, which roughly are: O is intrinsically P, and O looks, or is 
right now, P. Thus, a sentence such as That dog is dangerous could mean that the 
dog is dangerous as such (e.g. because it is an aggressive pitbull terrier) or that it 
is dangerous right now (e.g., because it is nervous). As noted, the ultimate 
explanation appeals to the different aspects that the nominal offers for 
predication: the ‘essential make-up’ aspect, or the ‘current look’ aspect. These 
two aspects are grounded in world knowledge, but affect truth-conditional 
content (see also Vicente, 2012). 
It is tempting, however, to think that there is no need to confront rich and thin 
semantics. It may be that some words have rich lexical meanings while others 
give access to scarcer information – as we have already suggested, it may be that 
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nouns give access to a rich informational structure, whereas verbs typically have 
more open-ended meanings – and that semantic composition consists in 
combining rich and thin meanings. The generative lexicon theory (Pustejovsky, 
1995) explains many cases of alleged polysemy in terms of such compositional 
mechanisms, where phrasal meanings arise as a result of interaction between 
the rich meaning of the nominal, and the thin meaning of the verb. An example is 
the different senses of bake in bake a potato (warm up) and bake a cake (create), 
which is analysed in terms of the process of co-composition, involving an 
interaction between the schematic meaning of bake and the lexical information 
provided by the nouns (cakes are artefacts; potatoes are natural kinds). Spalek’s 
contribution to the present volume (see above) may also serve as an illustration 
of this idea. The upshot would be that some types of polysemy (e.g. verbal) might 
be explained by appealing to thin semantics, while other types (e.g., nominal) 
might require an explanation in terms of a rich semantics. 
2.3. Literalist approaches 
Another type of approach to polysemy holds that polysemy resolution consists, 
in a first step, in accessing a concrete and semantically determined 
representation, which captures only one of the possible meanings of the 
expression, its ‘literal meaning’.  Once this literal meaning is accessed, speakers 
are driven towards other senses which are more consistent with contextual 
demands. We will refer to accounts of this type as ‘literalist approaches’. It is 
possible to distinguish at least three basic approaches that could be said to fall 
under this description: rule-based approaches, the coercion hypothesis, and 
lexical pragmatic approaches. 
2.3.1. Rule-based approaches 
It is possible that when we process a polysemous expression we first access a 
literal sense and we then apply a conventional rule which takes us to another 
sense of that expression. An early manifestation of such a rule-based approach is 
Jackendoff’s (1992b) analysis of the so-called ‘statue’ case: Imagine that we are 
watching a wax reproduction of the Beatles at Mme. Tussauds, and someone 
utters Ringo is the Beatle that I like the most, by this intending to communicate 
that ‘Ringo is the wax figure that I like the most’. On Jackendoff’s analysis, this 
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use is possible because there is a linguistic rule that tells us that ‘any NP can 
stand for an object or for a physical representation of that object’. On this view, 
then, there is a literal sense, let’s say ‘Ringo-the-drummer’, and the other sense, 
‘the-statue-of-Ringo’, is obtained through application of a linguistic rule. 
In many formal and computational semantic approaches it has been common to 
analyse regular polysemy (cf. Apresjan, 1974) as being generated by an 
inventory of lexical rules (Asher & Lascarides, 2003; Copestake & Briscoe, 1992, 
1995; Gillon, 1992, 1999; Kilgarriff, 1992; Ostler & Atkins, 1992). For instance, 
Copestake and Briscoe (1995) suggest that the universal grinder (Pelletier, 
1975), as well as a several conventionalised sub-cases of it (meat-grinding, fur-
grinding, and so on) might apply in typical instances of regular polysemy such as 
the following:  
(4) a. There was rabbit all over the highway. (universal grinding) 
b. Steven had rabbit for dinner. (meat-grinding) 
c. The model wore rabbit on the catwalk. (fur-grinding) 
In the examples in (4), the effect of the rules would be to create from a count 
noun denoting a physical object a mass noun with properties appropriate for an 
unindividuated substance (e.g., meat, fur, or general ‘stuff’). The rules are seen as 
coming with specific interpretive predictions based on lexically stored 
information, so that, for instance, a mass use of an animal term would have a 
‘meat’ sense as default. A parallel is often drawn between such lexical rules and 
derivational morphological processes: both appear to be ‘blocked’ by the 
existence of underived synonymous lexical forms (cf. glory/*gloriosity vs. 
veal/*calf) (Aronoff, 1976; Briscoe, Copestake, & Lascarides, 1995). Proponents 
of this sort of approach often claim that lexical rules are necessary to explain the 
productivity of regular polysemy, and to account for the availability of ‘default’ 
senses in uninformative contexts and the parallel that might be drawn with 
morphological processes (Copestake & Briscoe, 1992).  
However, one might argue against such rule-based explanations that they have a 
rather limited reach, and are only able to account for a small subset of the range 
of phenomena falling under the polysemy label. Moreover, they allow for little 
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flexibility of interpretation, and must appeal to pragmatics whenever a non-
default interpretation is intended by the speaker. A formal semantic account that 
has a wider scope than these rule-based explanations, in that it aims to explain a 
wider range of polysemy phenomena is the so-called ‘coercion hypothesis’ 
(Asher 2011, this volume), which we will discuss in the next section. 
2.3.2. The coercion hypothesis 
While a rule-based treatment has been proposed for a variety of cases of regular 
polysemy, one might question whether they form a kind in some interesting 
sense. For instance, while both the animal-for-meat (running rabbit vs. delicious 
rabbit) and the meal-for-customer (fresh ham sandwich vs. impatient ham 
sandwich) derivations could be described in terms of the operation of some kind 
of conventional rule, the two cases differ in a number of ways. First, the meat-
grinding rule seems more ‘natural’ in its application and cross-linguistic 
availability (see Srinivasan and Rabagliati, this volume) while the meal-for-
customer case has a strong conventional flavour, and may be idiosyncratic to 
certain language communities. Second, the two types of case behave differently 
on linguistic tests: while it is possible to say The rabbit was cute and delicious, 
one cannot say ?The ham sandwich is impatient and delicious. Based on this, 
Asher (2011) suggests that some regular polysemy is best treated in terms of a 
process of coercion, while other types of regular polysemy (i.e., logical polysemy) 
require the postulation of dot objects (see also Pustejovsky, 2005). As we have 
seen, dot objects are complex representations, and exemplify an 
underspecification approach to polysemy. Coercion, however, is a mechanism 
which takes as its input a literal meaning, and forced by a type-mismatch when 
composing it with the other lexical meanings in the sentence, delivers a different 
meaning as output. That is, the coercion approach to polysemy could be seen as 
an instance of a literalist approach. 
According to Asher (2011), we must postulate coercions whenever the dot-
object approach fails. In his theory, linguistic tests for identity of meaning, such 
as co-predication and anaphoric binding, play an important role in distinguishing 
between dot objects and cases of coercion. Dot objects, by their complex nature, 
should allow both co-predication and anaphoric binding. If the noun book is 
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represented as the complex type physical object•information, it should be 
possible to say The book is heavy but interesting or That book is awfully written. 
Put it back on the shelf. However, as we have just seen, there are cases of 
apparently regular polysemy that do not pass these tests, which suggests that the 
senses are not components of a dot object. According to Asher, these can be 
explained as coercions. 
In his contribution to the present volume, Asher focuses only on coercion and 
apparently retreats from his previous commitment to dot objects. The data he 
presents reveal that it is difficult to give a unified explanation of coercion and to 
draw a clear distinction between logical polysemy and coercions. While some 
cases of coercion allow anaphoric binding to the coerced material, others 
typically do not, but the results are not clear-cut. Asher presents the example of 
bottle (which, in previous accounts was analysed as a dot object) as a case of 
coercion where anaphoric reference to the coerced material is possible. For 
instance, the sentence John brought a bottle. It was yummy is clearly felicitous, 
even though bottle (coerced by the selectional restrictions of the predicate 
yummy) has a shifted meaning, referring to the content of the bottle. A case 
where the coerced material is typically unavailable for later reference is the ‘verb 
+ noun to verb + event’ coercion, as for instance, ?Jill started a book, which will 
last for years’. However, some contexts allow reference to the event, as in John is 
scared of starting War and Peace, because it will take him weeks. The same 
complexity can be observed for the ‘meal-for-customer’ pattern, where 
anaphoric reference clearly prefers the original denotation: ?The omelette left 
without paying, although it was very yummy is clearly odd. This is not always the 
case, though; for instance, it seems possible to say The omelette is enjoying it or 
The omelette with ham and cheese paid. 
A theory of coercion has to explain this diversity, and in particular why the 
original denotation, which allegedly has undergone coercion, can still be reached 
via anaphora in many cases. To this end, Asher presents two formal systems 
which give different results: TCL (Type Composition Logic: see Asher, 2011) and 
MTT (Modern Type Theory: see Luo, 1994). TCL postulates two levels of 
meaning: type requirements or selectional restrictions, and denotations. It treats 
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coercion not as a shift in the predicate or in the argument, but as type shift on the 
predication relation, i.e., on the way the predicate interacts with the argument, 
by inserting a functor around the argument. MTT, which differs from TCL mainly 
by treating common nouns as types (and not as predicates of type E→PROP), 
seems to be offering a version of argument shifting, though shifting in MTT 
operates very locally, and not upon the whole DP (it just shifts variables 
introduced by DPs). The result is that MTT allows both original and shifted 
meanings to be reached by anaphora. However, this result is not satisfactory, 
since both denotations are usually not available for anaphoric reference (see the 
examples above). 
In the end, Asher proposes that we may have two coercion mechanisms. The first 
is local coercion, the second a spell out mechanism, which takes local coercions 
and fleshes them out into the TCL functors. Spell out mechanisms sometimes 
work without restrictions, but usually they require certain discursive 
environments, for instance, being embedded in an explanation, for the coerced 
material to be available (cf. the sentence John is scared of starting War and Peace, 
because it will take him weeks). The final part of the paper focuses on some issues 
raised by data involving the modification of nouns by adjectives, which 
apparently undergo meaning shifts without there being type mismatches (e.g. 
flat tire, flat surface, flat country, etc.).  
Finally, it should be noted that coercion is usually thought to take time. Speakers 
have to retrieve a literal meaning, detect a type-mismatch, and solve it. There is 
some debate in the psycholinguistic literature as to whether this in fact happens 
in type shifting constructions such as I enjoyed the book (which may stand for I 
enjoyed [READING, or alternatively, WRITING, MENDING, BINDING, DUSTING, 
etc.] the book) (de Almeida, 2004; de Almeida & Dwivedi, 2008; McElree et al., 
2001; Pickering, McElree, & Traxler, 2005). It seems that the account Asher 
presents here may have empirical consequences which psycholinguistics could 
confirm or falsify. 
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2.3.3. Lexical pragmatic approaches  
A radically different approach to polysemy can be found within the field of lexical 
pragmatics, which specifically studies the interaction between an expression’s 
linguistically-encoded meaning and aspects of the context, and where context is 
not restricted, as it is in for instance Asher’s proposal, to material provided by 
linguistic structure (e.g., Blutner, 1998; Bosch, 2007; Carston, 2002; Recanati, 
2004; Wilson & Carston, 2007). However, it shares with rule-based and coercion 
approaches the ‘literalist’ assumption that polysemous expressions typically 
activate a fully conceptual representation (a ‘lexical concept’), which is used as a 
starting point for further inference.4  
A central insight of lexical pragmatics is that word meanings typically undergo 
pragmatic modulation in the course of utterance interpretation. Consider the 
examples in (5)-(7): 
(5)  [University student]: I didn’t get enough units. (‘credit modules’) 
(6) It’s boiling outside. (‘extremely hot’) 
(7) Will is a fox. (‘cunning, sly, devious…, etc.’) 
The idea is that while each of the interpretations in (5)-(7) is easily inferable 
from the context, none of them can be generated on the basis of linguistic context 
alone. The specification in meaning of the noun units in (5), the loose use of the 
verb boiling in (6), and the metaphorical broadening of the concept encoded by 
fox in (7), each requires the hearer to take the situational context into account in 
deriving the speaker-intended meaning. Lexical pragmatic processes such as 
these are thought to play a central role in giving rise to polysemy. The prevalence 
of polysemy in natural languages suggests that speakers and hearers might find 
it easier to extend already existing words to new functions than to invent new 
words for each sense, and lexical pragmatic processes are thought to play a key 
role in enabling communicators to do this. Indeed, some ‘radical’ pragmatic 
accounts tend to see polysemy as an epiphenomenon of pragmatic processes 
operating at the level of individual words: “In general … polysemy is the outcome 
                                                        
4 However, not all pragmatic approaches share this literalist assumption. As mentioned in Section 
2.1.1 above, Carston (2002, 2012), who is one of the main defenders of a pragmatic (relevance-
theoretic) account of polysemy, also espouses an underspecification approach (with a thin 
semantics) to lexical representations. 
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of a pragmatic process whereby intended senses are inferred on the basis of 
encoded concepts and contextual information” (Sperber & Wilson, 1998: 197). 
Falkum (this volume) defends a pragmatic account of polysemy and argues 
against rule-based and linguistic approaches, on which polysemy results 
primarily from the operation of lexicon-internal processes. On her approach, the 
linguistic system plays a much more restricted role in providing only a minimal 
output, or clue, in the form of a lexical concept which the pragmatic inferential 
system uses as evidence to yield hypotheses about occasion-specific, speaker-
intended meanings. To take an example, consider the cases of adjectival 
specification in (8)-(10)(11): 
(8) American Pastoral is a good book. 
(9) To become a member of Billy’s exclusive gang you had to have a good 
knife. 
(10) Mary bakes good cupcakes. 
On linguistic, Pustejovsky-inspired accounts, the derivation of the different 
senses of the adjective good in the examples above would depend on a lexicon-
internal, generative process of ‘selective binding’, enabling an adjective to make 
available a selective interpretation of an event expression contained in the 
lexical representation (or ‘qualia structure’) of the head noun, yielding the 
senses, ‘good for reading’, ‘good for cutting’, ‘good for eating’ respectively. 
According to Falkum, this sort of approach is too rigid, by allowing only lexically-
specified information to contribute to the generation of context-dependent 
senses of the adjective. Consequently, it must appeal to pragmatics whenever a 
non-default interpretation is intended by the speaker, as in the following cases: 
(11) a. Chomsky’s Aspects is a good book (‘interesting’). 
b. That’s a good book to use as a doorstop (‘heavy enough’). 
c. I need a good book to put me asleep (‘boring enough’). 
d. … 
In each of these cases good has a different sense, even though it is used to modify 
the same noun, book. And there are numerous other ways in which a book can be 
good (‘easy to read’, beautifully designed’, ‘useful to kill flies with’, and so on). 
 26 
Falkum’s point is that a pragmatic theory that is able to explain how such non-
default senses are derived should also be able to handle that part of the 
interpretive work that linguistic accounts do adequately. At the same time, she 
claims, it avoids many of the problems that have been discussed in connection 
with rule-based accounts, in particular with respect to interpretive inflexibility 
and overgeneration (Bosch, 2007; de Almeida & Dwivedi, 2008; Falkum, 2007; 
Fodor & Lepore, 2002). She suggests that the relevance-theoretic framework 
(Carston, 2002; Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2004, 2012) 
may be well suited for this task, and proposes an alternative approach to 
polysemy, in which it is treated as a mainly communicative phenomenon, which 
arises as a result of lexical concepts underdetermining the situation-specific 
concepts that are communicated by them, as part of hearers’ search for optimal 
relevance in the process of utterance interpretation. In each of the examples in 
(8)-(10) above, this would involve a narrowing of the concept linguistically 
encoded by the adjective good by a process of ad hoc construction (Carston, 
2002; Wilson & Carston, 2007), which takes as input encyclopaedic information 
activated by the lexical concepts in the utterance, as well as any other relevant 
situation-specific assumptions activated by the utterance situation, in deriving 
the communicated, ad hoc concept, a process which is constrained by the 
hearer’s occasion-specific expectations of relevance. On Falkum’s view, the 
existence of polysemy has a strong motivation on this pragmatic-inferential 
account, where it arises by necessity to meet the communicative needs of 
speakers and hearers. Furthermore, she claims, the assumption that our 
pragmatic inferential ability plays a fundamental role in the development and 
proliferation of polysemy in verbal communication, provides a promising basis 
for a unified account of its role in several domains, including acquisition, 
diachrony and non-verbal forms of communication. 
2.4. Sense networks and LCCMs 
Most of the accounts presented so far, and particularly the rule-based and 
coercion accounts, analyse polysemy as a mainly linguistic phenomenon. Lexical 
pragmatic accounts, on the other hand, downplay the contribution of the 
linguistic system and emphasise instead the communicative aspect of polysemy, 
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treating it as being governed by pragmatic inferential processes applying at the 
level of individual words. A third type of account, which we mentioned briefly at 
the beginning of this introduction and which has been very influential, takes 
polysemy to be not so much a linguistic or communicative phenomenon as an 
essentially cognitive one, which results from how our cognitive categories are 
structured more generally. The work that has inspired a host of accounts within 
the strand of linguistic known as ‘cognitive grammar’ is Lakoff and Brugman’s 
pioneering studies of English prepositions (Brugman, 1988; Brugman & Lakoff, 
1988; Lakoff, 1987; see also Langacker, 1988). On this approach, linguistic 
categories are taken to be no different than other kinds of conceptual categories, 
and most word meanings are seen as a type of radial category (that is, a central, 
prototypical subcategory, combined with a set of non-central extensions) in 
which the different senses of a word are organised with respect to a prototypical 
sense. The paradigmatic example is the English preposition over (Brugman 
1988):  
(12) a. The bird flew over the house. (‘above and across’) 
b. The painting is over the couch. (‘above’) 
c. The truck ran over the rabbit. (‘across’) 
d. Sarah lives over the hill. (‘on the other side’) 
e. Mary nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. (‘covering’) 
f. I will read the papers over the weekend. (‘temporal’) 
g. John has a strange power over Mary. (‘control’) 
h. … 
The idea is that over constitutes a radial category composed of a range of distinct 
but related senses, organised around a prototypical sense (assumed to be the 
sense in (12a) in Lakoff and Brugman’s accounts) in a network structure. The 
different senses of over exhibit typicality effects so that more typical senses are 
located closer to the prototypical sense in the network, while less typical senses 
– derived from more typical senses through a set of cognitive principles for 
meaning extension, such as for instance metaphorical extension --  are located in 
its periphery. This gives rise to chains of senses, in which sense a is related to 
sense b in virtue of some shared attribute(s), sense b is related to sense c, which 
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is related to sense d and so on. Sense relations, then, concern mainly adjacent 
members of the category, while members that are only indirectly connected in 
the semantic network may be very different in semantic content. 
A key assumption of the version of the cognitive semantics approach we have 
described here is that sense networks are stored in the long-term semantic 
memory of language users. In this respect, this account of polysemy is a radical 
version of the approach we referred to above as the ‘sense enumeration 
hypothesis’, in that the full range of senses are taken to be stored in semantic 
memory (which is why it has sometimes been called ‘the full-specification 
approach’, cf. Evans & Green, 2006). As we discussed, there are many problems 
with sense enumeration, and more recently, scholars working within the 
cognitive grammar framework have proposed a more moderate approach, taking 
into account the role played by the context in giving rise to novel senses of a 
word (Allwood, 2003; Taylor, 2006; Tyler & Evans, 2003). In particular, Tyler 
and Evans (2003) suggest an account of polysemy they call ‘the Principled 
Polysemy approach’, which retains the idea that polysemous senses are 
represented in terms of sense networks centred around a prototypical sense, but 
includes a methodology for distinguishing between those senses that are stored 
in semantic memory and those that are pragmatically constructed in context. 
In his contribution to the present volume, Vyvyan Evans develops a new 
approach to polysemy within the context of his Theory of Lexical Concepts and 
Cognitive Models (LCCM theory) (Evans, 2009, 2013). Evans’s approach stands 
out among the cognitive linguistic approaches by virtue of its distinction 
between units of linguistic knowledge in the form of ‘lexical concepts’, which 
encode highly schematic contents and typically underspecify situation-specific 
meanings (in this sense, Evans’ approach falls under the thin semantics version 
of the underspecification approach we dicussed above),5 and the non-linguistic, 
encyclopaedic knowledge in the form of so-called ‘cognitive model profiles’, that 
they give access to. A cognitive model is a is a coherent body of multimodal 
knowledge linked to a particular domain, and the cognitive model profile of a 
                                                        
5 Thus, Evans’s notion of a lexical concept is different from the one we usually find in the 
literature, which refers to concepts expressed by lexemes. In Section 2.3.3 on pragmatic 
approaches, ‘lexical concept’ is used in this more common sense. 
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lexical concept includes all the cognitive models to which it potentially gives 
access to, and constitutes what Evans terms the ‘semantic potential’ of a lexical 
concept (see Evans, 2009: 207, for more detail). 
In his paper, Evans distinguishes between three types of polysemy, which he 
analyses within the framework of his LCCM theory: conceptual polysemy, lexical 
polysemy, and inter-lexical polysemy. These are illustrated below:  
(13) That book is heavy/illegible/boring/long. (‘tome’/’text’/’level of 
interest’/’duration’). 
(14) We are in a room/in pain. (‘container’/’state’) 
(15) a. We are in pain/in a room (‘state’/’spatial’) 
b. We are on the run/on the sand. (‘state’/’spatial’). 
According to Evans, in (13) we have an instance of conceptual polysemy, in which 
an open-class lexical item (book) takes on slightly different interpretations in 
different contexts (cf. the examples in (3) and (11) above). From the point of 
view of Evans’s LCCM theory, this polysemy results from differential activation of 
regions of the cognitive model profile associated with the lexical concept [BOOK]. 
The idea is that [BOOK] gives access to at least the two primary cognitive models 
PHYSICAL STRUCTURE, relating to the physical artefact, and READING 
ACTIVITY, relating to the process involved in interacting with books, each of 
which consist of a large body of knowledge, or ‘attributes’ in Evans’s terms. The 
cognitive model PHYSICAL STRUCTURE is thought to include a TOME attribute 
and a TEXT attribute, while the cognitive model READING ACTIVITY is thought 
to include a DURATION attribute, and a LEVEL OF INTEREST attribute. Evans 
accounts for the polysemy of book in (13) in terms of differential activation of 
these attributes in each context.  
The lexical polysemy in (14) involves, according to Evans, distinct lexical 
concepts conventionally associated with the preposition in, more specifically a 
[PHYSICAL CONTAINER] lexical concept and a [PSYCHO-SOMATIC STATE] lexical 
concept. From the point of view of LCCM theory, a distinct lexical concept is 
characterised by having a unique lexical profile, that is, a specific set of semantic 
and grammatical selectional tendencies associated with it (e.g., the 
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ungrammatical sentence *We’re in war is taken as evidence that in cannot be 
applied to just any kind of abstract state). Evans then goes on to propose a 
principled methodology for examining the lexical profile of a putative lexical 
concept, and thereby for determining whether a sense involves a distinct lexical 
concept or not (for more detail, see Evans, this volume). 
Finally, the novel concept of inter-lexical polysemy, exemplified by (15), involves 
systematic similarities between distinct lexical concepts associated with distinct 
lexical forms. For instance, as Evans observes, the ‘state’ lexical concepts 
associated with in and on appear to have quite different semantic selectional 
tendencies. While the ‘state’ lexical concept associated with in selects for 
semantic arguments involving emotional or psychological force (in love, in pain, 
etc.) – instantiating the [PSYCHO-SOMATIC STATE] lexical concept – these 
appear to be incompatible with on (*on love, *on pain, etc.). However, states that 
are active for a delimited period of time, and those that appear to be under 
voluntary control and/or decision making, which Evans take to be instances of 
an [ACTIVE FUNCTIONING STATE] lexical concept (e.g., on duty, on sale, on the 
run etc.) are compatible with on but not with in (*in duty, *in sale, *in the run, 
etc.). 
In the last part of his paper, Evans discusses the notion of a ‘meaning spectrum’, 
a novel construct within his theory, which he describes as a bundle of semantic 
parameters or atoms of meaning, which are conventionally associated with 
lexical concepts. Such meaning spectrums are a central component of the 
account that follows of how novel lexical concepts are construed in context and 
how derived senses become established in a language. 
2.5. Concepts and conventions  
Recently, Hugh Rabagliati and colleagues (e.g., Rabagliati, Marcus, & Pylkkänen, 
2011) have tried to test whether polysemy extension in regular polysemy is a 
matter of learning conventions, whether it is mainly motivated by our conceptual 
structure, as many cognitive linguistic accounts claim, or whether the best 
explanation involves a mixture of the two. Their previous work has presented 
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and discussed psycholinguistic and developmental data. In this volume, Mahesh 
Srinivasan and Rabagliati introduce cross-linguistic evidence into the debate.   
By far most research on polysemy, both of the regular and irregular kinds (cf. 
Apresjan, 1974) has focused on English. An important question for an account of 
the phenomenon is whether we find the same patterns of polysemy across 
different languages or whether languages differ with regard to their possibilities 
for polysemy.  
Srinivasan and Rabagliati investigated a large number of systematic polysemy 
patterns found in English (e.g. ‘animal for meat’, ‘material for artifact’, ‘container 
for content’, etc.) and asked whether and how these were manifested cross-
linguistically. More specifically, they were interested in whether such systematic 
patterns of polysemy show low, moderate or high cross-linguistic variability, 
whether attested senses of these patterns (e.g., chicken for chicken meat) are also 
found in other languages, and whether patterns that are generative in English 
are also generative in other languages (e.g., seagull for seagull meat). To 
investigate this, they conducted a cross-linguistic survey comprising 15 
languages, in which data about 27 attested polysemy patterns in English were 
collected. Their participants, all native speakers of other languages but with good 
knowledge of English, were given examples of polysemy patterns (e.g., The 
chicken drank some water, The chicken is tasty) and were asked to rate how 
natural the translation equivalent in their own language was, and to report any 
other senses that fit the pattern that came to mind. To investigate the 
generativity of patterns in the other languages, participants were introduced to a 
newly coined word for the base sense of the pattern (e.g., the animal dax), and 
asked to rate whether the word could be felicitously extended (e.g., The dax is 
tasty) in their language. The results showed low variability with respect to the 
presence of the polysemy patterns investigated across languages: All patterns 
were present in multiple languages, and most were present in nearly all the 
languages included in the survey. However, with regard to the specific senses of 
the patterns that were instantiated across languages, they found considerable 
variability. For instance, the pattern material-for-artefact is cross-linguistically 
present but is instantiated in different ways: an example is the linguistic form for 
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‘glass’, which conventionally refers to a drinking vessel in English, a car window 
in Spanish and a mirror in Russian. Finally – and interestingly – their results 
suggested that patterns that have more similar senses across languages may also 
be more generative.  
Srinivasan and Rabagliati take their results to be best explained by a model that 
takes the structure polysemy to be mutually constrained by conventions and 
conceptual structure: More specifically, according to their ‘conventions-
constrained-by-concepts’ model, polysemous senses are learned conventions, 
but the process by which new senses are coined and learned are shaped by 
cognitive biases which make some sets of senses (related in particular ways) 
easier to learn than others. According to the authors, this would explain their 
findings that languages develop different senses (conventions) but that there are 
commonalities in patterns and senses across languages (cognitive biases). To 
explain the association between generativity and similarity in senses, they 
hypothesise that the degree to which a polysemous pattern ‘constrains’ its 
senses might play an important role. An example of a pattern that ‘tightly 
constrains’ its senses is the animal-meat alternation, in that knowing that a 
chicken is a kind of animal leaves no doubt about what the denotation of chicken 
is when it is used in a meat sense. A pattern such as material-for-artefact is more 
‘loosely constraining’, in that an artefact use of glass could in principle refer to 
several different objects made of glass (e.g., drinking vessels, windows, mirrors, 
etc.). The suggestion is that if a pattern constrains its senses more tightly, 
languages will be similar in the way these senses are instantiated, and moreover, 
the relation between them will be easier to abstract and generalise to novel uses. 
Finally, the authors speculate that patterns of polysemy might be rooted in 
children’s cognitive biases in language learning (e.g., about how an entity’s 
properties might be related to one another), where polysemy might arise as a 
way of reducing the arbitrariness in the mapping between word forms and 
concepts, and speeding up learning by allowing children to spontaneously infer 
new word senses. 
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3. Polysemy from an applied perspective 
Through this introduction we have had an opportunity to see that polysemy can 
be approached from different perspectives and using different methodologies. 
The different papers collected in this volume show what kind of findings 
different methods provide, and also how these different research methodologies 
can interact and converge in order to evaluate the merits and demerits of 
particular accounts. Kris Heylen, Thomas Wielfaert, Dirk Speelman, and Dirk 
Geeraerts’ contribution to this volume is the only one directly focused on 
methodological issues. In their paper, they present recent developments in the 
corpus-based and computer-assisted study of lexical polysemy. More specifically, 
they introduce Word Space Models (WSMs), a technique that was originally 
developed in statistical natural language processing for the task of automatic 
word sense disambiguation, but which is currently being developed as a tool to 
support lexicological and lexicographic analyses of word meaning in large 
corpora (Turney & Pantel, 2010). 
Heylen et al. start their discussion by pointing out that Word Space Models, or 
Distributional Semantic Models, are a logical extension of the statistical corpus 
analysis methods that are already established in the field. On the one hand, they 
are a generalisation of statistical collocation analyses in that they also use word 
co-occurrence patterns in corpora to infer word meaning, but rather than 
manually interpreting the collocations of individual lexemes, they systematically 
compare the collocational profiles of a large set of lexemes, and they use 
statistical cluster analysis to group corpus patterns into sets of patterns that are 
indicative of the same meaning. In the latter respect, WSMs are also similar to 
the ‘behavioural profile’ approach that has been used in cognitive linguistics for 
polysemy research since the mid-nighties. But whereas behavioural profiles 
usually rely on manually coded semantic properties, WSMs use automatically 
retrieved, directly observable corpus patterns. By combining the corpus-driven 
approach from collocation analysis with the statistical structure finding of 
behavioural profiles, Word Space Models can identify the different meanings and 
usages of a lexeme in an automatic and bottom-up way in large amounts of 
corpus data. The authors argue that the ‘big data approach’ offered by Word 
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Space Models is an essential extension to the lexicologist’s and lexicographer’s 
toolkit, for two reasons: First, the ever growing amount of available text data 
causes an exponential increase in the number of attestations that have to be 
processed in a lexical description to arrive at an adequate description of a 
lexeme’s semantics and use. WSMs allow us to deal with this data deluge by pre-
structuring attestations into possible senses which can then be analysed in 
further detail. Secondly, large amounts of data allow scholars to investigate 
trends and patterns that could not be studied in smaller corpora, e.g. the 
spreading of new words or new usages of existing words through social 
networks. Here, WSMs offer a semantically-informed trend analysis method. In 
the remainder of their contribution, Heylen et al. offer a non-technical 
introduction to the basic principles of WSMs and how they allow to group 
attestations of a polysemous item by their different meanings and uses. 
Additionally, they introduce a method to visualize the output of WSMs so that a 
lexical scholar can inspect and interact with the semantic patterns detected in 
the attestations. With a test case for the Dutch polysemous lexeme monitor, they 
show that WSMs in their current state of development are able to find 
lexicologically relevant patterns, but that further study of the exact relation 
between corpus patterns and semantics is needed to improve the models. To that 
end, they show how their visualisation allows the lexicologist to analyse which 
corpus patterns the model used to group an attestation together with one set of 
attestations rather than another. The contribution concludes with an outlook 
onto how WSMs can be further integrated into, and optimized for the linguistic 
study of word meaning, including the combination of a semasiological with an 
onomasiological perspective, and the addition of lectal factors like regional or 
register differences. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this introduction, we have given an overview of the central topics in the 
current inter-disciplinary research on polysemy, and of the main proposals on 
the table. Two main concerns in the contemporary discussion have been 
identified: the question of how the different senses of a polysemous expression 
are represented and stored, and the question of how new senses arise and 
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eventually establish as senses of a polysemous term. We have seen that most 
contemporary researchers do not support the sense enumeration model, in 
which polysemy and homonymy are treated mostly alike. While an alternative 
model (or models, possibly) is still under development, much progress has been 
made in recent years when it comes to inter-disciplinary integration, in terms of 
shared evidence, taxonomies and hypotheses. With this volume, we hope to 
make a significant contribution to this on-going integration.  
The debate concerning the underlying basis for polysemy -- whether it is 
(mostly) linguistic, cognitive or communicative -- is a relatively recent one on the 
current interdisciplinary agenda. We hope that our volume might contribute to 
inspire further research on these issues, which will also include much-needed 
evidence from development, lexical acquisition, and cross-linguistic variation. 
We are very happy to present this up-to-date collection of papers on polysemy. 
The volume stems from a workshop organized by the editors, and held in Vitoria, 
the Basque Country, in the autumn of 2012. The workshop was funded by 
MINECO (Spanish Government) as part of the research project Language and 
Thought: Lexical Meaning (Code FFI2011-30074-C02-02). That workshop was 
our first attempt to bring together scholars from different disciplines working on 
polysemy. The event was a great success, and is the reason why we both thought 
that this kind of volume would make an important contribution to the research 
on polysemy, which we regard as a very fascinating and surprisingly 
understudied phenomenon. We hope the reader will be as excited about this 
volume as we are. 
We would like to acknowledge the help and patience of the people at Lingua. We 
are grateful to The Executive Editor Johan Rooryck for deciding to accept our 
proposal for a special issue on polysemy and to The Special Issues Editor Anikó 
Liptak for her steady guidance, thoughtful responses and good disposition with 
us. Many thanks also to Lisa Gordon and Sara Bebbington at Elsevier for their 
efficient and reliable help with various administrative parts of the editorial 
process. We would also like to express our gratitude to the reviewers, who 
provided thoughtful and constructive feedback on the papers. Finally, we wish to 
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thank the authors of all submitted papers, without whom this special issue 
would not have been possible. 
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